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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Third
District Court granting a decree of specific performance of a
contract to plaintiff Property Assistance Corporation.

The

case is before this Court by assignment from the Utah Supreme
Court.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Must an option be exercised in strict compliance

with its express terms before a bilateral contract, capable
of being specifically performed, comes into existence?
2.

Is a party sho pays a debt of another, voluntarily

and without request, entitled to recover the amount of such
payment from the debtor?
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISION
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes,
ordinances, rules or regulations whose interpretation is
determinative of the issues presented by this appeal.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiff brought this action seeking specific
performance of an "option agreement".

Defendants moved to

dismiss the complaint on the ground that having failed to plead
compliance with the terms of the option, plaintiff hadn't stated
a cognizible claim for specific performance.

Though this motion

was denied, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint eliminating

any reference to an option and seeking either specific performance in contract or, in the alternative, damages for its
breach.

The parties made cross motions for summary judgment

which were both denied.
The matter was tried to the Court on June 16, 1987.
Following the trial, which consisted of the testimony of a
single witness, the Court below entered the judgment from which
this appeal was taken.
The material facts relating to this matter have never
been in dispute.

Mr. William Oelerich, president and sole

shareholder of the corporate plaintiff, approached the Roberts
in January of 1986 with an offer relating to the possible purchase
of their home in Sandy, Utah, by Property Assistance.

(R. 155,

transcript at pg. 13). Mr. Oelerich, whose business involved
obtaining equity in real property subject to foreclosure
proceedings, obtained the Roberts name from a Notice of Trustee's
Sale published in one of the newspapers.
Following some negotiations,

(See exhibit no. 1-P).

on February 2, 1987, Mr. and Mrs.

Roberts granted Property Assistance an option to purchase their
home. (See exhibit 2-P). The option granted was to expire in
seven days.

On the 7th of February the Roberts executed a

written extension of the option until February 26, 1987.

(See

exhibit 7-P).
During the period between February 2nd and February
26th, Mr. Oelerich entered into negotiations with Tracy Collins
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Bankf the holder of the second Deed of Trust

who had given

the notice of sale of the property which first drew his
attention.

Mr. Oelerich arranged to have the Trusteefs sale

postponed. (R.163, trans, at 21; exhibit 4-P).

In fact, on

February 21, 1987, he completely paid off the $40,069.87
balance on the note held by Tracy Collins.
at 23, exhibits 9-P, 10-P).

(R.165, trans,

At the time this payment was made

Mr. Oelerich did not seek or receive approval of the payment
from the Roberts and had no agreement with them that they would
reimburse the money so paid in the event he failed to exercise
the Property Assistance option.

(R.176, trans, at 34-36).

On Febraury 26th, Mr. Oelerich met with the Roberts
at

their home and requested an extension of the option.

Roberts declined.

The

Mr. Oelerich left without exercising his

option in accordance with its terms and the option expired on
February 26, 1987.

(R.181, trans, at 29,34,39).

The option form used by the parties originated with
plaintiff and Mr. Oelerich provided its non-standardized terms.
(R.175, trans. 33-34).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

An option must be exercised in strict conformity

with its express terms before any bilateral contract, capable
of specific performance, comes into existence.

The option

granted the plaintiff in this case required that it be exercised
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in writing.

As this was never done, by the plaintiff's own

admission, the option expired and no contract of sale was ever
entered into by the parties.

Accordingly, the trial Court's

entry of a judgment decreeing specific performance was the
product of an error of law.
2.

The Court below committed prejudicial error when

it entered findings of fact which were totally inconsistent
with the evidence.

In finding that the parties entered into

an "earnest money agreement" the Court failed to give credence
to the unambigious terms of the written option in question and
found a different agreement to have been made although no
testimony or evidence supported such a finding.
3.

A party who pays an obligation of another, volun-

tarily and without request, is not entitled to recover those
payments made for the benefit of the debtor.

Therefore, upon

remand the Court below should be instructed to enter a judgment
of no cause of action on the plaintifffs complaint.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF'S FAILURE TO EXERCISE
ITS OPTION IN STRICT CONFORMITY
WITH ITS TERMS IS A BAR TO ANY
ACTION SEEKING SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.
It is a fundamental and universal rule of law that
options must be exercised in strict compliance with their express
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terms.

This rule of law was relied upon by the Utah Supreme

Court to deny specific performance in Nance v. Schoonover, 521
P.2d 896 (Utah 1974).

The plaintiffs in that action held an option

to purchase real property which required tender of $17,000.00
in cash.

The plaintiffs timely notified the defendants that

they desired to exercise the option and would tender a personal
check for the payment required.

After being notified that such

a tender was unacceptable they sued for specific performance
of the terms agreement that they had an option to accept.

The

Supreme Court, in affirming the dismissal of the action, reiterated the rule of law in this state that options can only be
exercised in strict compliance with their express terms.
It is the plaintiff's contention
that their tender of a personal check
was sufficient to exercise the option
and further that their tender in their
complaint is sufficient tender to
entitle them to specific performance.
We are of the opinion that the Court's
finding that the option had not been
exercised in the period specified
in the option must be upheld. This
court has long adhered to the rule
that an option must be exercised in
accordance with its terms.
521 P.2d at 897; See also, Equitable Realty, Inc. v. Nielson,
30 Utah 2d 433, 519 P.2d 243 (1974).
In the instant case, plaintiff did not allege, and
did not in fact achieve, compliance with the agreement's requirement of written notice of the exercise of the option.

Such a failure

deprives plaintiff of any rights whatsoever under the agreement.
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As the Court noted in Cillesson v. Kona Company, 73 N.M. 297,
387 P.2d 867 (1964) :
In an option contract, with the
requirement of its exercise in
writing, the rule is that its
terms must be fully and completely
accepted in all parts, and its
provisions strictly complied with,
before it becomes an executory
contract.
387 P.2d at 870.
Failure to give written notice, when so required by
an option agreement, is not excused by conduct or actions which
expressly or impliedly manifest an intent to exercise the option.
In T.W. Anderson Mortgage Co. v. Robert Land Co., 480 P.2d 109
(Colo.App. 1970), the Court acknowledged the rule that the only
way an option holder can satisfy a requirement of giving written
notice, and thereby obtain further rights by virtue of the
option, is by giving written notice.
In the present case, the buyer
did not give to the owners the
written notice of the exercise
of the option as required by
the plain and unequivocal terms
of the contract. The buyer's
oral notice did not comply with
the terms of the contract and
was inneffectual.
480 P.2d at 110.
As plaintiff has not established its own strict compliance
with the terms of the option agreement (and, in fact, conceded,
it did not comply with its terms), the complaint for specific
-6-

performance should have been dismissed and judgment for defendants
entered.
POINT II
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED BELOW IS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE UNDISPUTED
EVIDENCE OFFERED AT TRIAL.
When the present action was filed, plaintiff referred
to its "option agreement" and sought a decree of specific
performance based upon its substantial
terms of the option.

compliance with the

After being confronted with the unequivocal

law denying relief in cases asserting substantial compliance
with options, plaintiff amended its complaint and alleged it
didn't have an option at all, but an enforceable bilateral
agreement.
In an effort to avoid the consequence of its failure
to exercise its option as required by its own contract, plaintiff
asserted that the agreement in question
option contract.

wasn't a "typical"

This assertion was both irrelevant and untrue.

While the terms of the purchase contract which plaintiff had the
option to render binding were somewhat unique, the option itself
was simple and entirely typical.

For a stated consideration the

plaintiff received the option to purchase a piece of real
property upon providing written notice of the exercise of the
option.

It failed to give notice within the applicable period

and the option expired by its own terms.

The option having

expired, there was simply no agreement which can be "specifically
performed."
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Pointing to the unusual terms of the agreement which
never ripened into a binding contract as an excuse for failing
to take the action which would have given life to that very
agreement is pure sophistry.

The terms of the purchase agreement

are entirely immaterial because the option was never exercised
as required by law.
In an effort to avoid the obvious law applicable to
this action plaintiff contended that the option agreement wasn't
an option agreement.

This suggestion, which is inconsistent

with the allegations of the initial complaint in this action,
is also completely inconsistent with the clear, unambiguous
terms of the agreement.

It is axiomatic that

In construing a document, courts
may not rewrite the provisions thereof, but must enforce an unambiguous
contract in accordance with its terms.
Griffin v. United Bank of Denver, 599 P.2d 866, 868 (Colo.
1979) .

Or, as expressed by the Utah Supreme Court, " [a] court

will not rewrite an unambiguous contract."

Provo City Corp. v.

Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803 (Utah 1979).
The term option is unambiguous.

A party cannot alter

the clear meaning of the term by simply asserting a differing
view of what he believes the contract should mean.
in Land v. Land, 605 P.2d 1248 (Utah 1980);
Where possible, the underlying intent
of a contract is to be gleaned from
the language of the instrument
itself; only where the language is
uncertain or ambiguous need extrinsic
-8-

As stated

evidence be resorted to. No such
ambiguity is present in this case,
nor was it asserted. Also, the mere
fact that parties urge diverse
definitions of contract terminology
does not, per se, render it ambiguous.
605 P.2d at 1251.
Defendants respectfully submit that the Court below
impermissably rewrote the unambiguous agreement of the parties
to incorporate terms which were absent from their contract.
In fact, the agreement signed by the parties isn't a bilateral
agreement at all.

Like all options it merely constituted an

offer to make a contract which was irrevocable during a specified
period.

However, when not effectively exercised during the

period, the option expired and the underlying proposed agreement
for purchase and sale never came into existence.

Obviously,

therefore, it cannot be specifically performed.
While the Court concluded that the parties1 "agreement
is not 'true option', but the equivalent of an earnest money
receipt and offer to purchase . . .," there was absolutely
no testimony to support such a conclusion.

The Roberts' never

agreed to waive the requirement of written exercise of the option
and expressly refused to extend the option.

The mere fact

that plaintiff was apparently laboring under a mistaken
assumption of the legal effect of the written option he was
granted cannot be the basis for according him contract rights
or excusing his failure to exercise the option.

Waiver of the

express terms of an option requires an express agreement.
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Equitable Realty, Inc. v. Nielson, 30 Utah 2d 433, 519 P.2d
242 (1974).
While the plaintiff has suggested that the Roberts
agreed to have a single "closing" and that this somehow
obviated the need for its exercise of the option, there is nothing
at all in the testimony which would support the conclusion that
agreeing to delay a "closing" constituted an express agreement
to waive written exercise of the option.

A "closing", as that

term is generally used in real estate transactions, is nothing
more than a meeting at which the parties simultaneously perform
pursuant to the terms of their contract.

In the absence of an

enforceable contract, no "closing" ever occurs.
It is manifest that the Court below, upon invitation
of the plaintiff, rendered a conclusion of law which was not
supported by the evidence in an effort to achieve what he felt
would be a just result.

However, a court is not free to dis-

regard the evidence and the applicable rules of law to shape
the relief he or she feels to be most fair under the circumstances.
As the plaintiff was the author of the option in dispute it
must be strictly construed against him.
576 P.2d 129 (Utah 1978).

Sandberg v. Klien,

He cannot now request the courts

to make an agreement for him he did not make for himself.
Accordingly, the judgment below must be reversed.
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POINT III
PLAINTIFF HAS NO ENTITLEMENT
TO BE REIMBURSED FOR PAYMENTS
MADE VOLUNTARILY AND WITHOUT
REQUEST BY DEFENDANTS.
During the option period plaintiff made a payment
beneficial to the property but without request by the defendants.
Plaintiff now seeks relief from the effects of this unilateral
action claiming "unjust" enrichment.
The contention that a person whose property has been
encumbered by virtue of the voluntary payment of another owes
a duty of restitution to the payor, though logically plausible,
cannot withstand scrutiny.

The law has long recognized that a

person who, without coercion or request, unconditionally confers
a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution.
Restatement, Restitution, §112 (1937).

See

While at first blush

such a rule seems to countenance a form of "unjust enrichment",
it has been noted that while such a payment does benefit the
debtor there is nothing unjust about allowing that person to
retain the benefit conferred because the payor has no right
to expect legal protection when intermedling in someone else's
affairs.

As noted in the Restatement,
where a person has officiously
conferred a benefit upon another,
the other is enriched but is not
considered to be unjustly enriched.

Id. at §2, pg. 16.
Two illustrations are offered to demonstrate the general
application of this rule.
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1. Being pressed for money, A fails
to pay bills owed by him and B,
a friend, pays the amout of such
bills to the creditor, in order
to protect A's good name. B is not
entitled to restitution from A,
even though upon paying the bills
he believed himself entitled to
reimbursement, intended to claim
it and, had he received an assignment
from the creditors, he could have
obtained it.

3. During A's absence and in the
belief that A will be willing to
pay for the work, B improves A's
land, which is worth and is offered
for sale at $5,000.00 to such an
extent that upon A's return he sells
the land for $8,000.00. B is not
entitled to restitution from A.
Restatement, Restitution, §112 at pg. 462.
An individual who voluntarily makes mortgage payments
on property, prior to the time when he has any legal interest
in the property, is not entitled to be reimbursed for such payments
by the land owner.

See Brusco v. Brusco, 407 P.2d 645 (Ore. 1965).

The same has been held to be true of one who pays property taxes
and assessments despite the lack of title.

As the Court noted

in Shumway v. Early, 56 Ariz. 126, 106 P.2d 194 (1940), relief
must be denied because
[i]t is well settled law that one
who voluntarily pays the debt or
obligation of another, when under
no duty to do so, may not recover
his outlay.
106 P.2d at 196. See also, McNalty v. Capp, 126 Cal.App. 2d
697, 271 P.2d 90 (1954).
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While occasionally overlooked, the requirement of
establishing

"unjust" enrichment is a predicate to restitution

and simply proving that a benefit has been conferred doesn't
meet this burden.

In Tabata v. Murame, 24 Cal.2d 221, 148 P.2d

605 (1944), the California Supreme Court set aside a jury verdict
entered after the trial court erroneously instructed the jury
that the plaintiff only need establish that a benefit was
conferred to demonstrate an entitlement to a quantum meruit
recovery.
There can be no recovery for
voluntary payment of a debt of a
third party without request and
with no promise of repayment.
148 P.2d 607.

The Utah Supreme Court has also recognized that

not every benefit bestowed carries with it an obligation for
payment.

See, generally, Commercial Fixtures & Furnishings, Inc.

v. Adams, 564 P.2d 773 (Utah 1977)1 Kershaw v. Tracy Collins Bank
& Trust, 561 P.2d 683 (Utah 1977).
While it is true that denying Property Assistance Corporation restitution will, in effect, work a forfeiture of all
payments it made during the period of its option, it has been
recognized that "option contracts do not come within the equitable
rule against forfeiture . . . "

Cillessen v. Kona Co., 387

P.2d 867, 870 (N.M. 1963).
CONCLUSION
Having failed to exercise its option in conformity
with its express terms, plaintiff forfeited any contractual
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rights it might have obtained had it exercised the option.
This fact requires reversal of the decree of specific
performance entered below.

Upon remand, the Court below

should be instructed to enter judgment for the defendant as the
alternative claim for unjust enrichment is not supported by
the evidence which demonstrates a voluntary and unrequested
payment was made for which equity provides no relief.
DATED this

day of December, 1987.

M. David Eckersley
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of
the foregoing were mailed this

day of December, 1987, to

the following:
Ellen Maycock
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

HOUPT & ECKERSLEY
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ADDENDUM

Exhibit 1

Option

Exhibit 2

Extension of Option

Exhibit 3

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

2nd
day of February
J9 86 , Between Qpuglas C. and Betty J . R o b e r t s , party
HKDE THIS

of the Ftrtt Part, hereinafter celled the'Set'crm and Property

Assistance

Corp.,

pa r

of the Second peri, hereinafter colled the 'Buyer '
I2HltTlf*ttt1j, That in conmderatujn of I 2 0 0 0 , 0 0
'o the Se
In hand pc\d by the Buyer, receipt whereof is herehy acknowledged the said Seller hereby vants
the Buyer the right and <yptwn to purchase uithtn 7
Jays from Out djte herecf Ail

of Lot 71, WiLlow Stream Estates t 5, accordin to the
official plat thereof on file and of record ?n#the office
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, State of Ltah,
hereinafter called "8021 Erique Way'\

If the Buyer denres to exercise the said option c\d shall, u,n/im 'he said period so notify
Seller m writing, which notice may be served persunelly upon the Seller 01 lift at the Sr" rs <' ieV
house or usual place of abode or be sent by mail, tuldressed thereto, withm ruch period, thu cation ^
then become a binding agreement upon the parties hereto for the sale and purchase of the *ul hi
end premises under the following conditions
1 The price for the said property shall be the sum of I 2 0 0 0 . 0 0
of which the amount poid for thus option shall be applied on account

2 Settlement is to take place etKruse,

p i US S e e

$1

Landi & Mavcock 620 Keirns Bldg

1J6 S. Mam h u Salt L?ke City, Utah

onthe 4 t h .

day of February

. 19 86, at 10:00

ockck

\

which time is of the essence of this egreement, when the Seller shall deliver a
warrar'y deed for the said premises, and the balance of *he purchase price it to be paid cr secured

RuTer agrees to market for sale H021 Lrique Uay at a lair
market price. Buyer agrees to pay t'> seller 23% of m»t
ptolils ol anv sale buyer iccepts, pi>nmt mjde upon lfic
closing of an} such sale.
Buyer agrees to assume responsibility for tirst ind second
mortgage obligations. Seller is obligated to have first
mortgage payments current through January 31, 10°(>.

7 In the etent f the Buyer not making, settlement m u r 'dance i ith the tcr~u K 'Lof
payment or payments male on account shall, at the Sellers option I* 'orfmted as liquuic*c i dj*na
fcr the fa lure of the Bw *r to settle, or be applied on account of the purchase pnee
4 The title to be delivered shad be a marketable title and shjtl he free and clear c( oh tncj
br nces including munxcival liens end assesrments and liability j^r n stsrments for trrproiemcnts n
icntfructfd (eicept as herein stated), this clawse to be operatu e as < / the (Ltc of thn a^ci^ent, a
the title is to be subject to all etirttng restrictions of record, the Seder, heme er, guaruntees that tK
are no restrictions in any conveyance or plans of record affecting th* said premises, which udl p

hbit the use and/or occut*ncy thereof as Property A s s i s t a n c e Corp.
and the premises shall be conveyed m the tame condition as the same now are, reasonable tear c
tear excepted
5 In the event that such title cannot he made hy the Seller as ' ove, and the Buyer u unanf/
to accept ruch title a* the Seller can make, then at Buyer's option, the above payment or pcyme
ihall be returned to the Buyer, together with the reasonable expenses of eiammtng the tale and r~ak
survey, or the Buyer may praeeaeee amy legal or equitable action to which the Buyer may be entitled.
9 Actual possession is to Be given ta the Buyer on the day of settlement, except as herein stat
If the Buyer accepts pctsrseton, w4th the SeUWs consent, before the im$ of settlement then the Se\
ikdl be allowed by a ay of idfustmeni, interest et 6% on the Lai ncc due from the lc:e of r mrr
to the date of settlement
7 T*x«4, water rtnts, intetese Oft incumbrances, ptcrper+y rentals and other current charges :*
be adsusted as of the date of smtlrment, unlets posmesMon be given prior thereto, in which case ill n
adfwrtmenU shall be made m of the de*e of delivery of pceeesMon
9. The Seller shall r*f for the drevMg aj the deed end all revenue rtampt thereon, if any
necessary, bui ell searches, tale tsmssrence end other conoeyemcisug npenset an to be paid for vy
Buyer.

EXHIBIT 1

Le\)E&c&*f COMPACTS*, 0fSf/U'/&/££//Z4KJ<s>E/
D£APES
:
£.*C<-vOE
jZ£f lZi6>£&tTCJZ-/}M0
FAH-U&tjT/=/x
rcet
io. Upon closing, seller agrees to occupy 8021 Erique
Way as Tenant for buyer for a period of 90 days, or upon premises

^ i q u e Way.

inis agreement cum-ingenL upun ^

L - —..

—

L\

removal of exclusive listing and commission tor buyer.
Ths wordi 'SELLER* and 'BUYErV in this agreement shall be construed to mean bo
plural and lingular number and to mean net only the party thereby dmgruited, but also hit, ,
their rerpectne h*%n, erecutore or administrwton. or in the eirnt that either or bvth p4r\u>% ,}f
potations, I/I or f.'unr mrceuort
Ths said optusn ami th4 consequent agreement, if any, may be assigned by the Buyer wit
written assent of ths Seller.

Jn SHitrua* OTbtreof. fa pcrtkt hemo Wt hereunto $et . s i g n a t u r e s
dated fa day ami yem first above written.
SICNLD, llALXD KHQ MttJVUULO
DC THE P M n i N G i Of

^
1^

- ^ ^f^^f^- • -y^cj^-

..
\*~-^^OA^X<3 .

/(/< >»L.. A . f i ^ — / ^

. [i

[/

^JJSC&....

[L

[L
-\

"

By
For: PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP.

EXTENSION OF OPTION
Douglas C. and Betty J. Roberts, as one party, and Property
Assistance Corporation, as the other party, hereby agree to an
extension for exercise of option to purchase the property which
is described in the attached Exhibit "A", until midnight on the

<2£_ d *y of

Dated

FF^£uA£\/
this

1986.

^ T day of

FFB£V4£\J

DCMiGLAS C .

ROBERTS

L

*%?/<> ^

/
s^ f

<-/[>v£Ut

BETTY J /

ROBERTS

PROPERTY

ASSISTANCE

Wilii^rTfTS.

EXHIBIT

2

/.

CORPORATION

&
Oelerich

ELLEN MAYCOCK - 2131
KRUSE, LANDA & MAYCOCK
A Professional Corporation
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

PROPERTY ASSISTANCE CORP.,
a Utah corporation,

]

Plaintiff,
>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
DOUGLAS C. ROBERTS and
BETTY J. ROBERTS,
Defendants.

)
]•

Civil No. C86-2125
Judge David S. Young

The above-entitled matter came on for trial without a jury on June 16, 1987,
pursuant to notice, the Honorable David S. Young presiding. Plaintiff Property
Assistance Corp. was present through its president, William J. Oelerich, and was
represented by counsel, Ellen Maycock, defendant Douglas C. Roberts was present in
person and represented by counsel, M. David Eckersley, and defendant Betty J.
Roberts was not present, but was represented by Mr. Eckersley. The court heard the
testimony of William J. Oelerich and received exhibits and the parties rested. The
court then heard the arguments of counsel. Based on the foregoing, the court now
makes and enters the following:
EXHIBIT 3

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff Property Assistance Corp. ("Property Assistance") is a Utah

corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake County, Utah. Property
Assistance Corp. was incorporated in December of 1985.
2.

Defendants Douglas C. Roberts and Betty J. Roberts (the "Roberts") are

residents of Salt Lake County, Utah.
3.

William J. Oelerich is the president of Property Assistance.

4.

On or about February 2, 1986, Property Assistance entered into an

agreement, received in evidence herein as Exhibit 2-P, with the Roberts.

The

agreement concerned the Roberts residence at 8021 Erique Way, Sandy, Utah. On
that same date, Property Assistance paid to the Roberts the sum of $2,000.00 as set
forth in the agreement.
5.

At the time that the parties entered into the agreement, there were :wo

obligations on the Roberts' home located at 8021 Erique Way in Sandy, Utah,
secured by trust deeds; the first was in favor of First Federal Savings & Loan, and
the second in favor of Tracy Collins Bank & Trust. The Roberts were in default with
respect to the payments on the second trust deed obligation to Tracy Collins Bank &
Trust and Tracy Collins had scheduled a trustee's sale for the property on
February 5,1986.
6.

On February 5, 1986, Property Assistance entered into an agreement

with Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, pursuant to which Property Assistance deposited
$40,000 with Tracy Collins Bank & Trust and Tracy Collins Bank & Trust agreed to
postpone its trustee's sale for 21 days. (Exhibit 4-P).
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7.

First Federal Savings, the holder of the first trust deed obligation,

approved the assumption of the first trust deed obligation on the Roberts' residence
by Property Assistance by letter dated February 4,1986.
8.

On February 10, 1986, Property Assistance entered into a listing

agreement with Eagar & Company with respect to the sale of the property.
9.

On February 13, 1986, Property Assistance accepted an offer to purchase

the property from Vicki and David Hill. The purchase price was $82,500.00.
10.

On February 7, 1986, the Roberts and Property Assistance entered into

an agreement to extend the February 2,1986 agreement to February 26,1986.
11.

During February of 1986, William Oelerich, on behalf of Property

Assistance, made the Roberts aware of all the steps he was taking with respect to the
property, including the agreement with Tracy Collins, listing the property for sale,
and acceptance of the offer to purchase the property. In addition, Mr. Oelerich
discussed with the Roberts the desirability of avoiding two closings, that is, a
conveyance of the property to Property Assistance and then a further conveyance of
the property from Property Assistance to the purchasers, David and Vicki Hill. The
Roberts indicated their assent to the avoidance of two closings.
12.

An additional agreement to extend the February 2, 1986 agreement to

April 18, 1986 was signed by Property Assistance and by Betty Roberts but was not
signed by Douglas Roberts.
13.

The February 2, 1986 agreement provided that the Roberts would pay

rent of $800.00 per month to Property Assistance during the time they continued to
reside in the property. The agreement further provided that a minimum payment of
$500.00 per month toward rent with the balance of $300.00 per month to be deducted
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by the proceeds of sale. On or about February 26,1986, the Roberts paid to Property
Assistance the sum of $500.00 representing rent for the property at 8021 Erique Way
for the month of February, 1986. On that same day, the Roberts informed Mr.
Oelerich for the first time they would refuse to proceed with the terms of the
February 2,1986 agreement.
14.

On February 21, 1986, the second trust deed in favor of Tracy Collins in

the amount of $40,069.87, was paid in full by Property Assistance and Tracy Collins
executed a full reconveyance of the property.
15.

On March 14, 1986, Property Assistance paid the first trust deed holder,

First Federal Savings & Loan, the sum of $368.90 to bring the first trust deed on the
property current.
16.

The Roberts have not paid any rent to Property Assistance since

February 26, 1986, to the present.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now makes and enters the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The agreement dated February 2, 1986, between Property Assistance and

the Roberts is clear and enforceable. That agreement is not a "true" option, but the
equivalent of an earnest money receipt and offer to purchase which was accepted by
the Roberts. The price of the property, pursuant to the agreement, is $40,069.37,
plus the balance on the first trust deed to First Federal Savings & Loan, plus
$2,000.00 previously paid to the Roberts, plus prejudgment interest at the rate of
10% per annum from February 21,1986, to the date of sale of the property.
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2.

Property Assistance performed and honored all its obligations under the

agreement and the Roberts unjustifiably refused to perform.
3.

Property Assistance is entitled to a decree of specific performance,

enforcing the terms of the February 2,1986 agreement. Pursuant to that agreement,
the Roberts should be ordered to convey title to the property to Property Assistance
within 30 days. Property Assistance should then list the property for sale and sell it
at a reasonable market value to be determined by Property Assistance. Property
Assistance should then pay to the Roberts 25% of the net proceeds of sale. Net
proceeds of sale are defined as follows: The sale price of the property less:
(a)

the amount of the first trust deed in favor of First Federal Savings &

Loan;
(b)

$40,069.87;

(c)

$2,000.00;

(d)

interest at the rate of 10% per annum on $40,069.87 from February

21, 1986, to the date of sale; and
(e)

any costs and expenses incurred in connection with the sale.

The remainder, or 75% of the net proceeds of sale, is to be retained by Property
Assistance.
4.

Pursuant to the agreement, the Roberts were required to pay to Property

Assistance the sum of $800.00 per month as rent. The court finds that this rent is
inherently reasonable and is approximately equivalent to the payment on the first
trust deed plus the payment that the Roberts would otherwise have had to make on
the second trust deed. The Roberts have made the first trust deed payment since
March of 1986 and Property Assistance should not be entitled to any further credit
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for rent, nor should the Roberts be entitled for any credit for making the first trust
deed payment.
5.

Based on the fact that Property Assistance accepted an offer to purchase

the property in February of 1986, for $82,500.00, the court finds that, should
defendants wish to appeal this matter, the amount of the supersedeas bond should be
set at $85,000.00.
6.

Property Assistance should be entitled to recover its costs incurred herein

which are as follows:
Filing fee
Recording fee: lis pendens
Service fees
Depositions: Roberts

$ 50.00
6.00
17.30
112.60

Total

$185.90

,

DATED thi&A?—'day of June, 1987.
BY THE COURT.

JUDGE DAVID S. YOUNG
Approved as to form:

M. DAVID ECKERSLEY
Attorney for Defendants
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